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Introduction: A Summary of International Laws of War 
 
Our History with Atrocity Crimes  
Article 1 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation, 
signed July 22nd, 1779, one of the first treaties the US signed, reads:  
That all offenses or acts of hostility by one or either of the contracting parties against the 
other be mutually forgiven and buried in the depths of oblivion, nevermore to be had in 
remembrance.  1
Even before the Articles of Confederation unified the American colonies in March, 1781, the 
foundation of the relationship between the United States and international law had been laid. 
This foundation relied, as the above quotation suggests, in the practice of forgiving and 
forgetting atrocity crimes. The very beginning of American foreign policy dictated that our 
nation bury our responsibility for atrocity crimes “in the depths of oblivion.” America’s history 
with international law and international crime has been peppered by instances of war crimes and 
crimes against peace that are rarely prosecuted because of the United States’ immense power.  
1 Continental Congress, Article 1, Treaty between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation, 
quoted in David Scheffer, “War Crimes and the Clinton Administration”, ​International Justice, War Crimes, 
and Terrorism: US Record ​(Vol. 69, No. 4, 2002), 1109.  
1 
Our nation’s relationship with international criminal law, however, has also been one of 
support and leadership. During the Nuremberg Tribunals,  
the State Department effectively merged war crimes and human rights by viewing them 
through a politically universalist, state-centered prism that made the prevention of cruelty 
a policy priority, 
write  Liliana Riga and James Kennedy in their study of the emergence of the human rights 
movement.  America’s leadership during Nuremberg altered the narrative about state-sanctioned 2
violence, transforming international legal theory from one respecting sovereignty above all into a 
system that made human life a priority.  
The duality of the United States’ relationship with international criminal law and human 
rights atrocities  is a fascinating theme that weaves through all of American history, but most 
distinctly demonstrates the contradictory nature of American foreign policy in the latter half of 
the 20th century. America is both protector of human rights and perpetrator of human rights 
atrocities, global police force and aggressor. The Cold War exacerbated the tensions caused by 
American military dominance.  The international political and physical power of the American 
military allowed the United States to do as it pleased in the 20th century with few consequences, 
but that power also brought watchfulness from the global community and an expectation that the 
United States would intervene when rogue states or leaders committed crimes against humanity. 
The international legal community has expected the United States to act and illegally intervene in 
some situations, but to pursue policy changes peacefully through diplomatic channels on other 
occasions.  
2 Liliana Riga and James Kennedy, “Putting Cruelty First: Interpreting War Crimes as Human Rights 
Atrocities in US Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” ​British Sociological Association Journal ​(Vol. 46, No. 
5, 2012),  862.  
2 
For example, when Slobodan Milosevic terrorized the Balkan states with his violent 
brand of Serbian nationalism in the 1990s, human rights monitors, refugees, and American 
citizens pleaded with Western forces to prevent Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign from 
becoming a genocide.  When NATO illegally entered the conflict by bombing Yugoslav military 3
targets, scholars and onlookers praised the Clinton Administration for bringing a war criminal to 
justice while also arguing that the United States had committed crimes against peace, and 
breached its treaty obligations.  This duality does not reflect two mutually exclusive arguments, 4
but rather, two conflicting, but valid, truths; the US occupies a unique place in the international 
order in which it both influences the creation of law designed to protect civilians and peace, but 
also violates that law to serve its own interests and ideology. The core argument of this thesis lies 
in analyses of three armed conflicts in Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Kosovo. The United States 
violated the laws of war, and because of American military and political predominance, never 
faced serious consequences. As this thesis will demonstrate, the international community’s 
inability to prosecute or properly punish the United States for grave breaches of the laws of war 
has had an immense impact on the development of human rights law.  
The Post-Nuremberg Laws of War and American Adherence  
The Nuremberg Tribunals represent a momentous turning point in international legal 
history; accordingly, one must understand Nuremberg as the foundation of modern international 
law before delving into the subject of American breaches of that law. The trials of members of 
the Nazi Party and perpetrators of the Shoah served not only as a reckoning for the decimation of 
3 Steven Livingston, “Media Coverage of the War: an Empirical Assessment,” in eds. Albrecht Schnabel 
and Ramesh Thakur, ​Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention,​ United Nations University 
Press (Tokyo, 2000), 377.  
4 For more information, please see Chapter Two on Kosovo.  
3 
Europe’s Jews, Poles, homosexuals, and other minority groups, but also as an assessment of the 
crime of war. International law following Nuremberg “witnessed a change in thinking about the 
rights, obligations, and duties” of the nation-state as an international actor.  5
The Crime of Aggression  
The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Chief Justice Robert Jackson saw the crime of aggression as 
the Nazi’s ultimate crime against humanity.  After Nuremberg, when drafting the Geneva 6
Conventions and the Charter of the United Nations, the United States and other Allied nations 
codified the crime of war.  These documents, signed and ratified by the United States, outlined 7
that states could only engage in violence against another state in self-defense, and even then, 
only if the United Nations Security Council had determined that that was the only course of 
action.  The UN Charter holds state sovereignty as an extremely important principle, declaring 8
that states cannot intervene in one another’s internal affairs. When there is “an internal struggle 
for control of a national society,” the UN Charter rules that “the outcome… [should be] virtually 
independent of external participation,” and “it is inappropriate for a foreign nation to use military 
power to influence the outcome,” as renowned international legal scholar Richard A. Falk 
summarizes.  Post-Nuremberg, wars of aggression were no longer permissible. Nonetheless, this 9
practice did not stop states from engaging in violent intervention, but rather, caused states to 
depict their wars and military conflicts differently.  Nations no longer state that their wars are 10
5 Henry T. King and Theodore C. Theofrastous, “From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for US 
Foreign Policy,” ​Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, ​(Vol. 31, No. 1, 1999), 50.  
6 Telford Taylor, ​The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials​, Alfred A. Knopf Publishing (New York, 1992), 45.  
7 Chapters 1, 2, and 3 have much more detailed discussions of the text of these documents. 
8 See above.  
9 Richard A. Falk, “International Law,” in ed. John Ratte, ​From Nuremberg to My Lai ​, Amherst College 
Press (Amherst, 1979), 174.  
10 Linda S. Bishai, “Leaving Nuremberg: America’s Love/Hate Relationship with International Law,” 
Review of International Studies, ​(Vol. 34, No. 3, 2008), 438-442.  
4 
just. Instead, states encourage a narrative of self-defense, of preemptive self-defense, or as 
peace-keeping missions when, in fact, the military action is taken to protect that nation’s interests 
abroad.  This shift in international legal practice has complicated international governmental 11
and legal bodies’ ability to apply the laws of war to modern conflicts.  
Defining War Crimes via the Geneva Conventions  
In 1950, Justice Robert Jackson wrote in a Supreme Court decision that  
modern American law has come a long way since the outbreak of war made every enemy 
national an outlaw, subject to both private and public slaughter, cruelty, and plunder.  12
Jackson was, of course, an idealist. Though American law dictated that civilians would be treated 
with respect and dignity, the pages of this thesis are filled with instances of enemy nationals 
indeed being treated as outlaws and combatants in the name of military necessity. Nonetheless, 
the laws to which Jackson’s opinion alludes is clear and decisive about how states must treat all 
civilians in times of war.  
The Geneva Conventions, as they are collectively called, consist of the First Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, the Second Geneva Convention for the ​Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea ​, the Third Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and finally, the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The United States signed these four treaties in 
1949, and ratified them soon after, adopting the majority of the terms in the US Army Field 
Manuals for Land and Sea Warfare.  This means that all American servicemen and women, all 13
11 Ibid. 
12 ​Johnson v. Eisentrager, ​339 U.S. 763 (1950), 768-769.  
13 This issue will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2.  
5 
American citizens, and all American leaders are obligated to follow the terms of the Geneva 
Conventions as the laws of war.  
The Fourth Geneva Convention obligates states to respect all foreign civilians, regardless 
of the state of the armed conflict in which the state is involved. States have an obligation to 
protect civilians and ensure that their militaries are actively protecting civilians.  States are also 14
prevented from committing what are called “grave breaches” of the laws of war. Grave breaches 
consist of the most heinous crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, kidnapping, forced 
deportation, and torture; committing any one of these acts constitutes a war crime.  15
Additionally, state signatories are required by the Fourth Geneva Convention to find and try 
perpetrators of such atrocities, regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality.  Unfortunately, as the 16
following chapters will demonstrate, the United States has broken each of these sacred 
obligations.  
Upon the creation of the International Criminal Court, Marc Thiessen, a spokesman for 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bluntly explained his committee’s refusal to support 
the ICC by simply saying “we are not willing to put the United States up to the justice of the 
world.”  Thiessen’s honest remark reflects much about America’s role in the global community. 17
First, the United States’ ability to simply decline to follow its treaty obligations without fearing 
real consequences is unique and has influenced a good portion of 20th century foreign policy. 
Second, Thiessen’s statement implies that the US has done wrong, and that there is justice to be 
14 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Article 2, ​Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)​, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html.  
15 Ibid., Article 147.  
16 Ibid., Articles 145-146.  
17 Marc Thiessen, quoted in King and Theofrastous,82.  
6 
faced, and crimes to be uncovered. Finally, the statement suggests that Thiessen believes that the 
global legal community would deem some actions criminal that Thiessen either thinks are 
justifiable or not criminal in the first place. As the final portions of this thesis will discuss, 
America’s military activities in the 20th century have had a significant impact on the 
International Criminal Court. 
Methods, Sources, and Structure 
The body of this thesis consists of three case studies in order to demonstrate the depth 
and impact of American war crimes in the late 20th century. The first chapter analyzes the US 
military’s response to war crimes committed in Vietnam, and the judicial structure of the US 
military in order to explain why American soldiers were never prosecuted in domestic or military 
courts for their war crimes. It does this by first describing the nature of American crimes and the 
culture of violence within deployed troops, discussing the political pressures that made true 
prosecution unlikely, and finally by detailing the impact these unpunished crimes had on the 
international legal order. Then, the second chapter will demonstrate the manners in which the 
CIA and the Reagan Administration violated the laws of war by supporting the violent 
Anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups that terrorized Nicaragua after the Sandinista Revolution in 
1979. Both of these chapters rely heavily on eyewitness testimony of both American citizens and 
soldiers and the victims and perpetrators of atrocity crimes, and compare the stories told to the 
international law we see broken in the testimony. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the human 
rights laws NATO broke in its involvement in the Kosovo conflict. This chapter differs from the 
first two significantly, as it is a demonstration of America’s role as a global protector during the 
7 
Clinton Administration. The thesis will conclude by discussing the ways in which these three 
conflicts have impacted the development of international criminal law after 1999.  
A theme that returns again and again in the study of American war crimes is the power of 
individuals; this is what separates a historical analysis of the progression of international law 
from a theoretical approach based on international relations. American foreign policy is not a 
predestined or even planned trajectory created by anti-humanitarian politicians. The identities, 
political affiliations, personal histories, and temporal locations of individual decision makers all 
influence American military activity and the consequences imposed when an atrocity takes place. 
One cannot view American military and legal history as a static, overdetermined timeline. 
Rather, these histories were processes shaped by political, cultural, and economic pressures 
specific to the circumstances in which they took place.  
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Chapter One: Atrocities in Vietnam and American Military Justice 
 
Introduction: 
The Vietnam War represents one of the darkest periods in American history, and 
certainly within the Cold War. The conflicted ended what was called “the consensus era” in the 
United States, a period of little mainstream partisan disagreement, and exposed stark divisions 
within American society over the place of the United States in the global community and the role 
morality ought to play in warfare and interventionism.  The signing of the Geneva Conventions, 18
as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, marked a new era in global cooperation and the 
prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity for the future; however, American actions in 
Indochina challenged these hopes. This chapter will focus on the United States’ failure to fulfill 
its obligation to prosecute its military’s war crimes and the consequences not prosecuting 
perpetrators of war crimes has had on international criminal law. 
18 The period immediately after the Second World War was an era of both domestic peace and Cold War 
anxiety. The consensus era refers to the relatively calm state of sociopolitical affairs between 1950 and 
~1968, during which period the American economy drastically improved quality of life. The consensus era 
perhaps appears as calm and bipartisan as it does because of the contentious era that followed it.  
9 
The United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War opened a new narrative about the 
rules of warfare in the international community and the application of the precedent of 
international law created during and immediately after the Nuremberg Judgement. The American 
military’s actions in Vietnam and the lack of international action against leaders in the United 
States contrasted the precedent set at Nuremberg and directly violated the laws of war codified 
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The war crimes committed by the United States’ military were 
not isolated events separate from the conflict as a whole, but rather, were representative of the 
atmosphere and culture of violence that characterized the Vietnam War. This chapter will survey 
the modern discussions of international law through the lens of the Vietnam War and United 
States war crimes, beginning with an analysis of the legality of the US entrance into the war, 
then with a discussion on the US military’s behavior during the war, and finishing with a broad 
survey of the effect the Vietnam War has had on international law and its application.  
Beginnings of an Intervention and Laws of War  
The United States first became involved in Vietnam before violent conflict actually 
began. During the Cold War, the “domino theory” arose. The domino theory was the concept that 
if a few regions fell to Communism, then soon all developing nations would be toppled by 
Communism as well, like dominoes, and the Soviet Union win the Cold War and control the 
world, threatening the United States’ national security.  Vietnam was elevated, by the National 19
Security Council, to the highest level of security due to fears that all of Southeast Asia would fall 
to Communism after the French left Vietnam.  Protecting Vietnam from the influences of a 20
19 George F. Kennan,​. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct". ​Foreign Affairs​ (25.4, 1947): 566–582. 
20 Perry Pickert, “American Attitudes Toward International Law as Reflected in ‘The Pentagon Papers’” in 
The Vietnam War and International Law ​ ed. Richard Falk, 49-93. Vol 4. Princeton University Press 
(Princeton, NJ, 1976). 56.  
10 
possibly leftist new regime became a national security priority. This line of logic lead to policies 
in the early 1960s that dictated that protecting South Vietnam’s right to self-determination 
became a military matter, rather than a diplomatic issue. Nation building became intervention, 
and the US broke with the Geneva Accords.  
Before the United States began the combat stage of its intervention in Vietnam, “[t]he 
distinction between what was to be done in a covert versus an overt manner was made on the 
basis of the legal requirements of the Geneva Accords.”  The United States covertly ignored the 21
requirements the international legal community created for third party intervention by not 
obtaining United Nations Security Council’s permission to intervene in the region, which still 
applied even though the Vietnamese governments (North and South) breached treaty law overtly.
 The United States’ role in choosing the South Vietnamese government was in violation of the 22
US’ treaty obligations to avoid intervention in another state’s internal affairs.   23
The Crime of Aggression and Collaborative Defense 
American and French involvement in the development of the Vietnamese government 
actually determined the nature of the Vietnam War; technically, the war was international 
conflict, and cannot be classified as a civil war because of American and French presence in the 
nation before and while armed hostilities began. The Vietnamese struggle became an 
international conflict because external forces (the French and the Americans) that were  “High 
Contracting Parties”  under the Geneva Conventions involved themselves before armed conflict 
21 Ibid, 65.  
22 Ibid., 65.  
23 ​International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ​Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)​, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287​. 
11 
began.  Because of American involvement, the conflict cannot be divided up among the parties 24
based on the nature of the involvement of one party to another; dividing up the various 
combatants becomes yet more confusing when one considers whether or not the Viet Cong, 
North Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese forces were aligned with or party to the laws of the 
Vietnamese state. The United States entrance into this conflict ​could ​be justified by the concept 
that the North Vietnamese regime attacked the South Vietnamese state, which was friendly to the 
United States, first. In this case, the United States would have entered the war not as an 
aggressor, but as an actor of collaborative defense.  
Collaborative defense describes a situation in which it is permissible for a third party to 
come to the aid of one of the groups engaged in combat as a defender. This means that the third 
party (in this case, the United States) may engage in warfare and defend another group only if the 
defendant was not the aggressor and experienced an armed attack. Though the United States 
came to the aid of South Vietnam before armed conflict began, the nature of guerrilla and civil 
warfare prevents the world from knowing which party actually fired the first shot, meaning that 
the United States does not have a fully sound claim to collaborative defense. Moreover, the 
United States did not follow the protocol set forth in the UN Charter. Articles 33 and 34 dictate 
that states may not intervene in one another’s internal affairs, let alone put troops on the ground, 
without UNSC permission; states must first make a complaint to the UNSC, which has an 
obligation to try every peaceful measure possible before allowing violence to take place.  25
24 Jordan J. Paust, “Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident-- A Response to Professor Rubin” in ​The 
Vietnam War and International Law ​, ed. Richard Falk, 359-378. Vol 3. Princeton University Press 
(Princeton, NJ, 1972). 361-362. See also: Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 2.  
25 ​United Nations, Articles 33-34, ​Charter of the United Nations​, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html. 
12 
 The North Vietnamese regime simply countered American and South Vietnamese 
interests for the Vietnamese state. Under the Geneva Conventions, conflicting interests did not 
constitute an attack on South Vietnam, and thus was not a valid reason for the United States to 
have entered the war, since both the North and South argued that the other was the initial 
aggressor.  Though the State Department, White House, and Department of Defense argued that 26
the United States was acting in defense of the freedom of the South Vietnamese state and its 
people, both the legal theory and the perception of events that these institutions relied upon are 
questionable.  Scholar and activist Richard Falk best synopsizes doubts over the application of 27
the defense justification: 
[t]he real issue is whether the State Department’s interpretation of what constitutes… 
[defense] has ever been recognized and accepted; or whether… the right of self defense is 
restricted to instances when the necessity for action is instant, overwhelming, and leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.  28
Indeed, the State Department did claim that the situation in Vietnam did call for instant and 
overwhelming action.  However, the application of the right of self or collaborative defense is 29
questionable. American actions during this tumultuous time are unfounded; Vietnam was 
threatening only in respect to the domino theory, and not actually threatening to the state security 
of the United States. Self defense, under the Geneva Conventions, implies defense once one has 
been attacked; the United States State Department applied the term self defense to mean defense 
of state interests, rather than of the state or the states’ allies territories and peoples.  
26 ​ICRC. See also: Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
27 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ​"Laos and Viet-Nam--A Prescription for Peace," (Washington, D.C., 22 May 
1964), ​Department of State Bulletin​, (8 June 1964). See also: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, ​"The 
Defense of the Free World," (New York, 21 May 1964), ​Department of State ​Bulletin ​, (8 June 1964).  
28 Richard Falk, ​Crimes of War​. Random House (New York, 1971), 196.  
29Memorandum for the President's Special Committee, "Military Implications of the US Position on 
Indochina in Geneva," 17 March 1954, ​The Pentagon Papers ​(Gravel Edition, 1972), 451-54. 
13 
Moreover, American intervention in Vietnam demonstrates a desire to control the fates 
and governmental structures of other nations and peoples rather than a desire to defend the 
defenseless. Technology and innovation following the second World War globalized American 
interests, and in the second half of the 20th century, the United States and other former empires 
worked to add weight to their influence in former colonies. This use of influence inherently gave 
more power to the larger, more economically stable nations, which then became inherently 
repressive, using the resources of the smaller, dependent state, even though the larger nation did 
not officially claim control of the smaller. “Multinational corporations, arms sales, and training 
programs… all exert[ed] an… interventionary influence” even without the use of a military as 
the economic elite in capitalist nations pressed for specific government programs in the occupied 
state.  Even if the North and South in Vietnam had reunified and never came to blows, 30
American and French influence and presence would have affected Vietnam’s autonomy.  
Before discussing the war crimes that the United States committed, one must first 
understand the principles of international law and decide whether or not the laws of war are 
applicable to United States involvement in Vietnam. Many regard the Vietnam War as an armed 
conflict since the Congress never declared war upon any Vietnamese state. This does not excuse 
American atrocities. The Geneva Conventions bind nations in any armed conflict in which either 
war is declared officially by a party or in which one party occupies the territory of another and 
engages in armed hostility with another party.  Even in the absence of a declaration of war 31
international laws of war apply, following Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  This is 32
30 Richard Falk, ​Human Rights and State Sovereignty​, Holmes & Meier Publishers (New York, 1981). 131.  
31 ICRC. See also: Gertrude Chelimo, “Defining Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law”, 
Student Pulse: Law and Justice ​ (2011).  
32 ICRC, Article 2.  
14 
true in the United States as a constitutionally enforced principle, because Article VI, Section II of 
the Constitution declares that “all treaties made… under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the land.”   33
The United States had never denied the applicability of international law or warfare to 
American military actions in Vietnam. Moreover, the Department of State declared in 1966 that 
“the rules of international...armed conflict apply regardless of any declaration of war,” repeating 
the words of Article Two of the Geneva Convention.   34
Nevertheless, the military did not follow the rules of warfare that the United States had 
signed into law. When the Viet Cong began breaking the rules of warfare, the American military 
did as well. The United States may have only been following the Viet Cong’s example, but the 
“the laws of war continually apply to both sides in a conflict, irrespective of whether the other 
side has committed or is committing frequent violations of these laws.”  35
Defense by claiming that the other side was also committing a crime is called a ​tu quoque 
defense, and was unsuccessfully employed at Nuremberg by Nazi war criminals on trial.  The 36
Vietcong resorted to more brutal guerilla tactics, which put American leaders in a confusing 
position of deciding what was militarily necessary to defeat the enemy; if the other side begins 
committing crimes to gain more ground, how could the American military hope to win the war 
33 United States Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2. “​This constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”​ The United 
States Congress ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1955 after signing the treaty in 1949.  
34 Anthony D’Amato, Harvey L. Gould, and Larry D. Woods, “War Crimes and Vietnam: The Nuremberg 
Defense and the Military Service Resistor”, ​California Law Review ​, (Vol 57, Is 5, 1969).  
35Ibid. 
36 For more information on the ​tu ​ ​quoque ​ defense and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s ruling of inadmissibility, 
see: Nicole A. Heise, “Deciding Not to Decide: Nuremberg and the Ambiguous History of the Tu Quoque 
Defense”, ​Social Science Research Network​ (2009).  
15 
without committing those same crimes? Rather than follow the laws of war, the American 
military resorted to dirtier and dehumanizing tactics. The line between what was wrong and what 
was necessary to win the war was blurred for American combatants and the United States 
ignored the international law and precedent that dictated that it was still expected to follow the 
rules of warfare. As the war moved farther away from permissible combat, the more 
overwhelming the sense of lawlessness and violence became for combatants on the ground.  
Atrocity Crimes and the American Soldier 
This atmosphere of brutality was the context in which horrific massacres occurred, like 
Son My and My Lai. The environment bred confusion, and violence; it confused the military’s 
goals, so that military leaders pressed commanders for high body counts, with fewer other goals, 
a trend that several Vietnam veterans called “body count mania.”  Captain Michael O’Mera 37
noted after his discharge that “the command emphasis on body count was so tremendous that it 
was felt… at the lowest level,” and that “the only measure of success in Vietnam… seemed to be 
body count.”  The goal of the war, as the captain saw and experienced, was not to free Vietnam, 38
but to “wage war against the Vietnamese people.”  According to Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva 39
Convention, states must protect the lives, well-being, and dignity of any person that is not a 
confirmed combatant, regardless of their race or ethnicity.   Instead, American soldiers 40
37 Robert B. Johnson, “Statement on Policy and Command,” ed. The Citizens Commission of Inquiry, ​The 
Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam​, (Vintage Books, New York, 1971), 47.  
38 Michael O’Mera, “Statement on Policy and Command,” ed. The Citizens Commission of Inquiry, ​The 
Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam​, (Vintage Books, New York, 1971), 71.  
39 Ibid., 73.  
40 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Article 3, ​Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)​, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html.  
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systematically brutalized Vietnamese civilians in order to leave potential Viet Cong combatants 
with no material resources.  
The Mekong Delta saw unrivaled brutality as the target of Operation Speedy Express. 
OSE was a major air operation intended to cleanse the Delta of Viet Cong operatives via 
helicopter warfare, most significantly in what were called free fire zones. Free fire zones were 
areas in which civilians were told to leave before a certain time. After that time, the American 
military would “shoot anything that ran,” and raze the surrounding villages in order to purge 
them of Viet Cong.  Air warfare became a mark of the American military’s depreciation of 41
Vietnamese lives by allowing combatants to overlook the differences between Viet Cong and 
civilians, in that they were instructed to fire at will at any movement, rather than engaging with 
another human.  
Air warfare was much safer for American soldiers, but it also made for far more 
gratuitous violence.  Pressure for a body count that likely far exceeded the number of actual 42
enemy combatants led to the 9th Air Division (one of the air divisions responsible for Operation 
Speedy Express) having the lowest weapons-captured-to-enemies-killed ratio in the entire 
Vietnam War-- meaning the 9th Division killed the most people who were likely to have only 
been civilians, as they were completely unarmed at the time of their deaths.   43
The 9th Air Division’s mistakes are demonstrative of the body count mania that 
characterized the orders military leaders gave. The testimony of many Vietnam veterans, 
including that of the Concerned Sergeant, highlighted the haunting and omnipresent press for a 
41 Neil Sheehan, “Should We Have War Crime Trials?”, ​The New York Times​ (March 28, 1971).  
42 Ibid.  
43 Nick Turse, “A My Lai a Month”, ​The Nation ​ (2008), 14.  
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higher and higher body count.  The Concerned Sergeant expressed his concern at the violence 44
taking place, and at the pressure from his commanding officer to “shoot anything that move[d]” 
in a public letter to General Westmoreland.   The logic of the extremely high body count goal 45
was that to decrease the dead rural Vietnamese population meant to decrease the strategic base of 
support and number of potential new members for the Viet Cong, regardless of the criminality of 
this tactic.  46
The devaluing of Vietnamese life became endemic in the American military. Evidence of 
possible war crimes came into the light through the testimony of soldiers returning from the 
field, like Captain O’Mera and the Concerned Sergeant. In addition to his comments on aerial 
warfare, the Concerned Sergeant also reported that “it was common to detain an unarmed 
civilian and force them to walk in front of [a unit] in order to trip enemy booby traps.”  This 47
practice is a direct violation of the rules of war as laid out in the Geneva Convention, as it 
constitutes “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to [the] body” of a civilian.  48
Declassified Army investigation papers show that evidence was found to support the Concerned 
Sergeant’s claims, and the similar claims of other military personnel, confirming American 
violations of the laws of war.  Unfortunately, even though legislation was drafted in Congress to 49
create sufficient judicial resources to prosecute American war criminals,  
44 Sheehan., 31. “The words Lieutenant Calley used [to] describe the act of slaughtering the 102 men, 
women, and children for whose deaths he is being held responsible evokes this atmosphere [of violence] 
in a most uncanny fashion. He told the prosecutor that he was ordered ‘to waste the Vietnamese… waste, 
waste them, Sir.’ Were this just Lieutenant Calley speaking, the word would not carry much meaning, but 
the word is from the argot of the American soldier in Vietnam. Human beings are ‘wasted’ there, they are 
blown away. Soldiers have a unique ability to find words to describe the reality of wars.”  
45 Turse, 14.  
46 Ibid., 15-16.  
47 Ibid., 14.  
48 ICRC.  
49Deborah Nelson and Nick Turse, “Civilian Killings Went Unpunished”, ​The New York Times​ (August 6, 
2006). 
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in the period after the disclosure of the My Lai massacre, when the legislation had the 
greatest prospect of winning approval, [the President and Attorney General] were 
deficient in the moral qualities that might have...provide[d] Congress with political 
leadership, 
and the several attempts Congresspeople made to reign in the Vietnam conflict were defeated.  50
Had President Nixon or Attorney General John Newton Mitchell been different men, the history 
of the Vietnam War would be wildly different.  
 While individuals should be held responsible for their crimes, some crimes of war may 
be blamed on individuals, the daily practices and expectations that the American military 
engaged in built the culture of violence that allowed war crimes to occur.  The My Lai massacre 
is one of the most striking examples of this environment, but the daily atrocities that took place 
created a context in which My Lai seemed acceptable and encouraged a disregard for 
Vietnamese life. The scholars Orville and Jonathan Schell wrote in a letter to the ​New York 
Times​ that Army units were being ordered not to “generate” any more refugees, because the field 
pacification camps in which the Army held displaced persons were becoming too full.  After 51
that decision,  
peasants were not warned before an airstrike was called in on their village… The usual 
warnings by helicopter loudspeaker or air dropped leaflets were stopped...They were 
killed in their villages because there was no room for them in the swamped pacification 
camps. It was under these circumstances of official acquiescence to the destruction of the 
countryside and its people that the massacres of… [My Lai] occurred.   52
It is as though the American military taught its forces that when in doubt, kill.  
Punishment? The Dearth of Courts Martial  
50 Patrick Hagopian, ​American Immunity: War Crimes and the Limits of International Law, ​University of 
Massachusetts Press (Boston, 2013), 3.  
51 Orville Schell and Jonathan Schell, Letter to the NY Times, (Nov. 26, 1969), 44.  
52 D’Amato, et. al., 1088. 
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When courts-martial did occur in order to address the criminality of certain actions, they 
were often to try individual combatants, and not commanding officers. Moreover, these 
individuals were not charged with war crimes, but with murder or manslaughter, despite these 
actions falling directly under the United States Army Field Manual.  The Army Field Manual’s 53
1956 laws of land warfare are specific on what types of actions constitute war crimes, and what 
treaties soldiers are obligated to adhere to. The Manual dictates specifically that “at the request 
of a party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted… concerning any alleged violation of the 
[Geneva] Convention.”  Members of the American media, American government, and the 54
American military repeatedly called for the investigation of potential war crimes perpetrated in 
the Vietnam War; by not opening any such investigation at the request of parties to the conflict, 
the United States Army violated its own laws of warfare. Moreover, the Manual acknowledges 
that the United States is signatory to Article 146 of the Geneva Convention, which orders that 
Contracting Parties 
shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of 
their nationality, before ​its ​own courts.  55
By prosecuting members of the armed forces for murder or manslaughter rather than the war 
crimes they actually committed, the United States Army breached the international, domestic, 
and military law by which it was governed. International legal scholars like Richard Falk, 
Gabriel Kolko, and Jonathan Schell wrote eloquent and outraged books, letters, and opinion 
53 ​Department of the Army, Headquarters. (1956). ​Law of Land Warfare ​(FM 27-10). Retrieved from 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf​. Relevant sections include (but are not limited to): 
4a; 4b; 9; 25; 29; 33b; 34b; 41; 495; 496; 498; 499; 501; 502; 504; and 506.  
54 Ibid., Section 496.  
55 Ibid., Section 506a, 506c.  
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articles, but to no avail; even the American people could not compel the American government 
or military to properly prosecute its servicemen.  56
The Trial of Captain John Kapranopoulos  
The court martial of Captain John Kapranopoulos is a particularly disturbing case study. 
Kapranopoulos was court martialed for the murder of two Vietnamese civilians, though his 
actions were clearly under what the Army Field Manual calls a violation of the laws of war. 
When asked what to do with an unarmed and unidentified captured Vietnamese noncombatant, 
Kapranopoulos told his soldiers “I don’t care about prisoners, I want a body count, I want that 
man shot.”  When another unarmed Vietnamese man was captured and his men asked what to 57
do, he replied, “Are you sh***ing me?” Kapranopoulos ordered both civilians shot.   58
Despite the testimony of several members of his group who witnessed and/ or took part in 
the killings, Captain Kapranopoulos was found innocent of premeditated murder. While the 
evidence may have proved Kapranopoulos guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the circumstances 
in which the trial occurred probably affected the ability of the panel to find against the young 
captain. All courts-martial were heard by panels before 1969. When the courts-martial took place 
in Vietnam, these panels were made up of  active combat commanders; declaring Kapranopoulos 
guilty would have been difficult for men likely sympathetic to his predicament, given that they 
were physically and mentally surrounded by the culture of dehumanization of the Vietnamese.  59
56 See eds. Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, ​War Crimes and the American Conscience ​, Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston Publishing (New York, 1970). Knoll and McFadden’s work features several of the 
public letters and articles written by Kolko, Falk, and Schell.  
57 Fred L. Borch, “I Want That Man Shot”, ​The Army Lawyer​ (September 2014), 1.  
58 Ibid., 1.  
59 Ibid., 3.  
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The ​Kapranopoulos ​decision is an example of the devaluation of Vietnamese lives, and enforces 
the statement that “military courts sometimes follow[ed] the unofficial ‘mere gook’ rule.”  60
Public Outcry and International Response  
Americans and the international community noticed this atmosphere of brutality. 
Veterans and members of the media tried to spread the word about the atrocities being 
committed by writing to American leadership like the Concerned Sergeant did, by giving 
testimony as many veterans did in the film ​Hearts and Minds, ​or by testifying in 
non-prosecutorial Congressional hearings ​.  The military continued holding courts martial 61
without charging any of the accused with war crimes, and the American federal judicial system 
also did not prosecute any military personnel for their actions in the war.  
If the United States had an interest in prosecuting members of the military for their 
actions in Vietnam, it could have without contradicting any domestic or foreign precedent. . In 
the United States, military personnel may not be prosecuted for crimes abroad in state courts, but 
they could have been prosecuted in federal courts.  Similarly, joint offenses committed by 62
military personnel abroad and domestically are classically tried by military courts ​and ​civilian 
courts, which could have been employed by the United States during Vietnam.  Unfortunately, 63
in 1971 the federal government announced that it would not prosecute veterans who had violated 
60 Ibid., 4. The “mere gook rule” is a moniker for the unofficial, but omnipresent, notion that the 
Vietnamese people were merely “gooks.” Borch asserts in his piece that military courts during the 
Vietnam War often discussed and ruled on the extra-judicial killings of Vietnamese civilians as if the 
civilians were less than human, or that their deaths were less significant than the deaths of civilians 
elsewhere.  
61 For more information on the Winter Soldier Investigation and testimony, see: Ernest Bolt, “Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War and the Winter Soldier Investigation”, (University of Richmond, 1971).  For 
more information on the film ​Hearts and Minds​, see: Peter Davis, ​Hearts and Minds, ​BBS Productions 
(1974).  For more information on the Dellums Committee Hearings, see  The Citizens Commission of 
Inquiry, ​The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam​, (Vintage Books, New York, 1971). 
62 Paust, Vol. 4, 460.  
63 Ibid., 462.  
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international law due to the lack of precedent for doing so in the American legal system and the 
political controversy prosecution could cause.   64
American military law is extremely complicated, consisting of many different written and 
unwritten codes and practices, compounded by the military’s separation from the domestic 
judicial system. Many in the military argue that servicemen and women cannot be tried in a 
domestic court with a civilian jury because such a jury would not be a jury of the servicemen’s 
peers.  The military’s own codes promote the policy of prosecuting soldiers for crimes without 65
calling them war crimes. “The Manual for Courts-Martial...provides that… a specific violation of 
the [US Army Field Manual] should be charged rather than a violation of the law of war.”  This 66
practice is illegal under the Geneva Conventions, and violates the very spirit of the laws of war 
by favoring Americans; the US government has allowed the Army to write a law literally 
excusing its soldiers from prosecution under the Geneva Conventions. The US Army Field 
Manual even directly says in Paragraph 507(b) that “the US normally punishes war crimes only 
if they are committed by enemy nationals.”  During the 1950s, when writing its Field Manuals 67
and the Manual for Courts-Martial, the American military walled itself off from the rest of the 
64 Ibid., 447. “In April 1971 the United States declared that it would not seek to prosecute United States 
ex-servicemen who have violated the international law of war in Vietnam. Only two justifications were 
given for the government’s failure to engage in a war crimes prosecution program. First, a rather dubious 
excuse for law enforcement rests on the view of some government legal experts that the issue is ‘too hot’ 
politically now. Secondly, some legal experts within the government had expressed a doubt whether 
present federal law allows the trial of civilians for war crimes committed while in the military.” After reading 
extensively within Paust’s own work and federal law, it is clear that civilians may be tried in federal courts 
for war crimes committed while in the military.  
65 Thomas Wayde Pittman and Matthew Heaphy, “Does the US Really Prosecute its Service Members for 
War Crimes?”, ​Leiden Journal of International Law, ​(Vol. 21, No. 1, 2008), 169. .   
66 Ibid., 171.  
67 ​Department of the Army, Paragraph 507(b).  
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American judicial system, effectively ensuring that an American soldier would never be charged 
with war crimes.  68
The refusal to prosecute put the pressure on the international community to handle the 
blatant violations of war crimes law. The Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal answered the 
call early in the Vietnam war, opening an intensive investigation on the actions of the American 
military and the various international laws these actions broke. Unfortunately, the Russell 
Tribunal could not prosecute; it only investigated. The Russell Tribunal recommended that 
forums be held in the United States in which veterans could testify; collections of testimony led 
eventually to a Congressional inquiry spearheaded by Representative Ronald Dellums. The 
Dellums Committee heard four days of disturbing eye witness testimony that implicated the 
military in hundreds of war crimes, and recommended the Pentagon prosecute members of the 
military for their crimes in Vietnam.   69
Head of the Russell Tribunal Jean Paul Sartre believed that there should have been a 
permanent Nuremberg Tribunal to deal with the crimes of war.  The temporary nature of both of 70
these tribunals impeded their ability to hold states accountable. Moreover, Russell Tribunal was 
never intended to prosecute; Russell advocated that the international law must be enforced by 
state structures and by the ideology of not perpetrating crimes in the first place, rather than 
because of the condemnation of international courts or other states.   71
68 Pittman and Heaphy, 173.  
69 The Citizens Commission of Inquiry, ​The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam​, 
(Vintage Books, New York, 1971), vi-xiii.  
70 Falk, ​State Sovereignty, ​196. The full Sartre quotation: “‘There is a cruel lack of that institution [the 
Nuremberg Tribunal]-- which appeared, asserted its permanence and universality, defined irreversibly 
certain rights and obligations, only to disappear, leaving a void which must be filled and which nobody is 
filling.’”  
71 Ibid., 196. Falk argues that Sartre had too much faith in an institution’s ability to enforce change; rather, 
Falk wrote, the world would be better served to have an ideological shift that stressed the impermissibility 
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Since the end of the Vietnam War, international human rights law has evolved rapidly. 
The generalized norms of international law as set forth in the main legal instruments on human 
rights are either declaratory in stature (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), 
nonbinding because powerful nations have not ratified, or simply discounted because there is no 
body of international law enforcement .  The American military’s blatant disregard for 72
international human rights and the laws of war in Vietnam best exemplifies this lack of respect 
for international legal concerns. If nations as powerful as the United States ignore the treaties 
they have signed, the international community can have no hope of enforcing those treaties, as 
the next chapters will demonstrate.  
The United States’ crimes in Vietnam went mostly unpunished. This fact tunnels through 
the foundation of international law; without international prosecution or condemnation for 
breaking international law, international human rights law and the rules of warfare become 
useless. After World War Two, General Curtis LeMay reflected that if the Allies “had lost the 
war, we all would’ve been prosecuted as war criminals.”  The Geneva Convention and the 73
establishment of rules of combat were intended to ensure that regardless of ​who​ won a war, both 
sides would face the consequences for taking the lives of noncombatants. The world lost a 
chance to enforce this concept when leaders in the American military were not prosecuted as war 
criminals.  
 
 
of violations of human rights and international law, instead of putting the onus on an international 
institution that states were unlikely to respect over their own authority.  
72 Ibid., 155.  
73 General Curtis LeMay, quoted by Alfonso A. Narvaez, “Gen. Curtis LeMay, an Architect of Strategic Air 
Power, Dies at 83,” ​New York Times ​(October 2, 1990).  
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Chapter Two: Responsibility and Oversight in Nicaragua 
Introduction: 
26 
For over 40 years, the United States-supported Somoza family network ruled Nicaragua 
with an iron fist. The regime maintained its power by oppressing the people, keeping rural 
Nicaraguans largely illiterate, intensely impoverished, and indebted to the few wealthy 
landowners who benefited greatly from the Somoza dictatorship. Among these beneficiaries 
were American investors who held vast shares in Nicaragua’s agricultural industry.  Somoza’s 74
National Guard maintained order in the small country through violence, intimidation, and 
crackdowns on the press, many members having trained at the United States’ controversial 
School of the Americas.  Despite the repression tactics Somoza and his Guard employed, a 75
revolutionary movement called the Frontera Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (The National 
Sandinista Liberation Front) successfully overthrew the dictatorship in July of 1979, immediately 
installed a leftist government, and began implementing what many conservatives  in the United 
States believed to be radical social changes.  
While the Sandinista government reduced the rate of illiteracy in Nicaragua from 50% of 
the population to just 15% in less than a year, eradicated polio in three years, and outfitted rural 
communities with hospitals and health centers as well as modern food production systems, the 
Reagan administration began efforts to overthrow the regime almost directly after President 
Reagan’s inauguration in 1981.  These efforts began as covert support for anti-Sandinista 76
groups (which from here will be referred to as ​contras ​) and developed throughout the 
early-1980s into overt financial, material, and organizational support accompanied by a crippling 
74 For more on basic Nicaraguan history, see Luciano Baracco, ​Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation ​, 
Algora Publishing (New York, 2005).  
75 For more information on the School of the Americas, see Richard F. Grimmett and Mark P. Sullivan, 
“United States Army School of the Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns”, Federation of 
American Scientists, (2012), ​https://fas.org/irp/crs/soa.htm​.  
76 Donald R. Pfost, “Reagan’s Nicaraguan Policy: A Case Study of Political Deviance and Crime,” ​Crime 
and Social Justice ​(27/28, 1987), 67.  
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economic embargo. Reagan and his administration continually encouraged support for the war 
and justified US involvement by using existing Cold War anxiety and emphasizing the potential 
for the spread of Soviet-style communism throughout the Western Hemisphere, even though the 
Sandinistas had little contact with the USSR, and the Sandinista regime was quite dissimilar 
from that of the Soviets. Reagan used rhetoric similar to that used to justify US engagement in 
Vietnam, by consistently arguing that should Nicaragua remain under the leadership of the 
Sandinista government, all of Latin America was vulnerable to a communist-takeover. Though 
this line of thought seems illogical now, in the 21st century, the latter half of the 20th century in 
the United States was dominated by this sort of anxiety, frequently referred to as the “domino 
theory,” which suggested that should a few “Third World” states fall to communism, the others 
in that region would as well, theoretically endangering American security interests and the 
survival of democracy.   77
The President used what scholar Donald R. Pfost calls “the bogey of the communist 
threat” as a means to justify continued illegal intervention in Latin America, defending his war 
by underscoring the common narrative of the time that portrayed the Cold War as a struggle 
between good and evil, with America and democracy on one end of the spectrum, and the USSR 
and communism on the other.  Of course, as this chapter will demonstrate, the truth is much 78
more complicated. The ​contras ​ were not “freedom fighters,” as Reagan liked to say, but were 
rather dangerous paramilitary groups who tore through Nicaragua committing gruesome 
77 President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined “the domino theory” when arguing about the dissolution of the 
French colony in Vietnam. For the full speech launching the popular phrase, see President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, “Vietnam and the Domino Effect,” White House Press Conference, April 07, 1954, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-gives-famous-domino-theory-speech ​.  
78 Pfost, 83.  
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atrocities under the guise of war, outfitted and advised by US officials and CIA operatives 
throughout the 1980s.   79
However, though the ​contras ​ were the direct perpetrators of most of these crimes, key 
players in the US government were also guilty of these crimes against the laws of war. By 
engaging in a proxy war that indiscriminately and intentionally targeted civilians, the United 
States breached treaty obligations both by interfering in the state of Nicaragua’s affairs, forcing a 
trade embargo, and supporting and advising the ​contras ​ as they committed horrendous war 
crimes. This chapter will demonstrate that the CIA and other US government officials were not 
only complicit in these crimes, but were aware of and encouraged attacks on civilians that the 
officials knew or should have known were violations of the laws of war, meaning such officials 
were also in violation of international and domestic laws.  
Pre-existing Law: 
It is important to note before detailing the instances of criminal activity exactly what 
constitutes a crime under international law, though this chapter will more thoroughly discuss 
American breaches of law after detailing the crimes committed. According to Article Two of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, these laws apply ​even if ​ neither party acknowledges the war or 
declares war officially, meaning that regardless of Congress’ decision not to declare war against 
the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the US is and was still legally obligated to follow the 
laws of war.   Furthermore, the United States’ engagement in hostilities in Nicaragua breached 80
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which dictates that states must first  
79 President Ronald Reagan, quoted in John B. Oaks, “Mr. Reagan’s ‘Flim-Flamming’”, ​New York Times 
(April 17, 1985), A27.  
80 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Article Two”, ​Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)​, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287, ​http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html ​.  
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seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means,  
 
before engaging in behavior that would “endanger the maintenance of international peace,” 
generally in the form of a formal complaint to the UN Security Council.  Unless Nicaragua, as a 81
state, attacked the United States or its citizens violently and suddenly, the US had no legal right 
to bypass the UN-required mediation phase. 
 Essentially, before engaging in any armed attack, parties to the UN Charter must make 
every effort to solve the dispute, and request UNSC approval to engage in armed self- or 
third-party defense.  One should note, additionally, that the Rio Treaty of 1947 which 82
established the Charter of the Organization of American States (both of which the US is a party 
to) have similar requirements for states preceding any use of force.  The details of these treaty 83
obligations and the proceeding breaches by the Reagan Administration will be further analyzed 
later in this chapter.  
Domestically, in the spring of 1984 Congress rejected Reagan’s request for $21 million 
of aid for the two largest contra groups, the Frontera Democrática de Nicaragua (Nicaraguan 
Democratic Front, FDN) and the Alianza RevolucionDemocrática (Democratic Revolutionary 
Front, ARDE), which led the Administration to use millions of dollars of discretionary funding 
to support the ​contras ​.  Congress held out until the summer of 1985, when the President’s 84
81United Nations, “Article 33, Paragraph 1”, ​Charter of the United Nations​, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html ​.  
82 ​United Nations, “Article 37, Paragraph 1”, ​Charter of the United Nations​, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html ​.  
83 ​Organization of American States (OAS), ​Charter of the Organisation of American States​, 30 April 1948, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3624.html ​.  
84 Cynthia Arnson, “The Reagan Administration, Congress, and Central America: the Search for 
Consensus,” in ​Crisis in Central America ​, edited by Nora Hamilton, Jeffry A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and 
Manuel Pastor, Jr., Westview Press, (Boulder, 1988), 46-47.  
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domino theory rhetoric and  promise to provide only “food and clothing and medicine and other 
supplies for survival” won $27 million in “humanitarian” aid for the ​contra ​ groups.  While 85
Reagan promised to limit support to humanitarian aid, American officials, American 
mercenaries, and CIA operatives were actively training ​contra ​ forces, designing operations, and 
supplying millions of dollars’ worth of weapons. Though technically within the President’s 
power, this deception of Congress and therefore the American people inspires serious ethical 
questions about the foundations of the war and American lawmakers’ understanding of aid to the 
contras ​. This description of obligations to international treaties and the American political 
community is intended to help readers understand the gravity of American involvement in the 
contra’s ​ horrific warfare in Nicaragua. 
Contra​ Activity: 
The man said ‘Stop shooting! We are civilians! I am a physician from Germany. 
Don’t kill us!’ Jimmy Leo didn’t let this bother him. As the foreigner cried out again, 
‘Don’t kill us!’ Jimmy Leo began firing at him, from the head down to the chest… We 
were satisfied when they were all dead.  86
The rest of the account of an FDN attack on a van full of 13 civilians is too gruesome to include 
in this work. In an interview with two foreign nonprofit workers (one German, the other 
Mexican), Eduardo Lopez Valenzuela recounts a 1982 massacre during which three women were 
brutally raped and then murdered as their ten companions, all health workers, looked on.  Lopez 87
tells the interviewers about the rest of his small band’s day, during which they mutilated and 
killed two other civilians.   88
85 Arnson, 50. See also: Hendrick Smith, “Stopped Short: Congress Reins in Reagan on Nicaragua 
Foreign Aid-- For Now”, ​New York Times ​(April 21, 1985), E1.  
86 Eduardo Lopez Valenzuela, interview with Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón, ​The Contras: Interviews with 
Anti-Sandinistas, ​Synthesis Publications (San Francisco, 1984),​ ​64.  
87 Ibid, 64. 
88 Ibid, 65.  
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The account is horrifying. Nonetheless, it is not unique, neither in the interviews that 
Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón recorded, nor in the accounts that witnesses, survivors, and other 
perpetrators have given. Another former FDN militant told Eich and Rincón bluntly, “We had 
attacked civilian vehicles. There were dead, seriously wounded, and we took prisoners.”  At 89
first glance, it seems a description of the same attack Lopez described, but instead, it is an 
account of a completely separate attack, one of the many by FDN and ARDE fighters that killed 
thousands of Nicaraguans, the vast majority of them civilians, including women, children, and 
the elderly.  The ​contras ​ made no attempt to suggest, as American soldiers in Vietnam had, that 90
the civilians they attacked were guerilla enemies; rather, as director of the FDN Adolfo Calero 
told reporter Stephen Kinzer in 1984, “There is no line at all, not even a fine line, between a 
civilian farm owned by the government and a Sandinista military outpost,” continuing to argue 
that arbitrary killing of civilians was entirely legitimate.  Between 1982 and 1984, 23 primary 91
school teachers, 135 adult education teachers, and 747 other ​confirmed ​ civilian deaths at the 
hands of ​contra ​ militants.  Through eyewitness testimony, from both perpetrators and victims or 92
witnesses, we also know that mutilation and gang-rape before death were common occurrences.  
Additionally, the contras systemically conscripted an unknown number of men and 
women from the countryside to fight for the anti-Sandinista cause. Though many joined 
voluntarily after promises of a high pay and steady food supply, thousands of ​campesinos ​ were 
89 Jeremías Hernández Membreño, interviewed by Eich and Rincón, 116.  
90 Father Bob Stark, interviewed by Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steers, ​Intervention on Trial ​, Praeger 
Publishing (New York, 1984),96. Father Stark provides yet more evidence of contra violence.  “This past 
May, for example, the contras attacked a village when there was a baptism party going on, and killed 
twenty people, including nine women and five children.”  
91Stephen Kinzer, “ Nicaraguan Rebels Step Up Raids In Coffee Areas as Harvest Nears”​ New York 
Times, ​23 Nov 1984: A1. 
92 Pfost, p. 69  
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kidnapped as forced recruits, especially in the northern Atlantic Coast region.  Orlando 93
Wayland, who eventually escaped the ​contra ​ army, described in an interview the experience of 
being tied to members of his community, and forced to walk for four days and three nights, 
without stopping, to a training camp in Honduras.  “Three women gave birth on the march,” 94
Wayland said. “As soon as a child was out, the umbilical cord was cut and they had to go on 
immediately.”  Upon arriving at the training camp, Wayland was tortured for days, and then, 95
along with the other men from his village, was told that he could either fight for the contras, or 
continue marching to an unknown location. Wayland chose to become a soldier, but first, he was 
again tortured for two months by being tied to an ant hill, shoved underwater, tied securely in a 
river for days at a time, and being beaten regularly.  After finally being told that “whoever fled 96
the camp was shot on the spot,” Wayland was given training, a uniform, and a weapon, but upon 
meeting the Sandinista force during his first forced battle, he was able to flee to safety.  Though 97
Orlando Wayland was able to escape, many more likely were not able to; though there is no 
existing data on the number or fates of forced recruits in the ​contra ​ armies, the systemic manner 
in which Wayland’s captors kidnapped his village and the testimony of other ex- ​contra ​ leaders 
suggest that Wayland’s experience may have been shared by thousands of Nicaraguan men.  
The forced conscription of the ​campesinos ​ is just one of the many war crimes ​contra 
groups committed. By attacking and destroying hospitals, health centers, and religious centers, 
and by kidnapping, killing, torturing, and interning women, children, the elderly, and the sick 
93 Pfost, 69.  
94 Orlando Wayland, interviewed by Eich and Rincon,121-123.  
95 Ibid, 124. Fortunately, and somewhat shockingly, Wayland said that all three women and their 
newborns survived the march.  
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and wounded without proper supplies, the ​contras ​ violated Articles 14, 16, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 50, 
55, 58, 76, 78, 85, 89, and 127.  In violating these conditions, the ​contras ​ committed what the 98
Geneva Conventions call “grave breaches” of the laws of war. Grave breaches are defined as the 
willful killing, torture, rape, forced recruitment, unlawful confinement and deportation, and 
causing great physical or mental suffering.  These crimes, of which there is indisputable 99
evidence, constitute the most serious violations of any laws in history, and, as this chapter will 
soon argue, were supported by the United States government.  
 
American Involvement: 
The United States supported the ​contras ​ by steadily supplying money, weapons, and 
strategic planning, while simultaneously damaging the Nicaraguan state with a trade embargo. 
These forms of aid were construed by the Reagan Administration as “humanitarian,” but in fact, 
allowed the US government to exercise control over the ​contra ​ groups, even during military 
operations. The extent of this control is a keystone in the debate over whether or not the United 
States violated international agreements. This section will demonstrate that CIA operatives (and 
therefore the US) influenced ​contra ​ military operations using financial support, by supplying 
weaponry, and by participating in paramilitary training and strategic planning with the ​contras ​.  
Financial Support: 
98 IRCR. Though the contras are not a signatory state, they are still obligated to follow the laws of war as 
citizens of a signatory state. Moreover, there was a duty to prosecute them due to ​aut dedere aut 
judicare, ​which dictates that any state has the obligation to prosecute those who breach international 
criminal law, regardless of that state or party’s signatory status.  
99 IRCR, Article 50. 
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Between 1981 and 1986, an estimated $231 million was sent to the ​contras ​.  The first 100
~$80 million sent between 1981 and 1983 was sent by the CIA with President Reagan’s 
approval, without Congress’ knowledge, while the greatest aid package Congress authorized 
($100 million in 1986) was labeled as humanitarian aid.  Instead, this financial aid allowed the 101
contras ​ to build up their forces, hire mercenaries, and become a fully operational army. Without 
the money the US gave in the name of humanitarianism, the ​contras ​ would not have been 
capable of building the force that decimated villages and towns throughout Nicaragua. In an 
interview with Eich and Rincón, Pedro Javier Nuñez Cabezas, one of the leaders of the FDN, 
said that the FDN was able to operate only after American financial support.  
Everything came from the ​gringos ​… Before that, when there were financial problems, 
nothing happened, no action.  102
Nuñez’ comments suggest that had the United States not sent what Nuñez described as “every 
conceivable kind of support,” the FDN would not have become operational.  This highlights the 103
significance of American support. 
Material and Arms Support 
As Nuñez said in his interview, “everything came from the ​gringos ​,” including 
weaponry.  Another ​contra ​ agent,  Jorge Ramirez Zelaya, noted that his group was supported 104
by the US “with comprehensive financial aid, with weapons, and with war material,” since 1982. 
He explained that he never wanted for weapons after the Americans became involved, and that 
100 Pfost, 68.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Pedro Javier Núñez Cabezas, interviewed by Eich and Rincón, 50. It is significant that many of the 
former contras that Eich and Rincon interviewed identified Núñez as a leader with considerable contact 
with the American operatives.  
103 Ibid. 
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he was in near constant contact with Americans identifying themselves as working for the CIA.
  105
Although the Reagan Administration repeatedly assured Congress that any aid given was 
only humanitarian, suggesting that aid packages contained only food, clothing, and medicine, 
when the ARDE claimed they had insufficient arms to take a port in 1982, the CIA began weekly 
airlifts of weapons and ammunitions to ARDE camps.  Moreover, an unnamed “Western 106
ambassador” told reporter Joel Brinkley that he watched planes drop “duffle bags from low 
altitudes” at the Nicaraguan border throughout the spring of 1982.  Officers from the ARDE 107
told Brinkley that American pilots were flying the planes and delivering arms, but that other 
members of the ARDE leadership were “burning all the evidence and identification” of the 
planes and their airdrops.  One FDN member even told Eich and Rancón that though FDN 108
received support from other states, at least the majority of his group’s weapons were from the 
gringos.  109
Operational and Strategic Support 
American material and financial support were vital to the ​contras’ ​ ability to wage war. 
However, American involvement in the planning of military operations and the training of contra 
soldiers had perhaps the greatest influence on the ​contra ​ war. Though CIA operatives, the 
Reagan Administration, and proponents of the war in Nicaragua would later claim that 
Americans had little to no influence on the activities of the contras, the evidence suggests 
105 Jorge Ramirez Zelaya, interviewed by Eich and Rincon, 40.  
106 Joel Brinkley, “Threats by CIA Said to Influence Anti-Sandinistas,” ​New York Times,​ April 22, 1984, 10.  
107 Ibid, 10.  
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otherwise. Americans served as hired mercenaries, teachers and trainers, as well as strategic 
advisors within the ​contra ​ structure.  
In their interviews with former members of the FDN and ARDE, Eich and ​Rincón heard 
hours of testimony about ​gringo​ leadership in ​contra ​ training camps. During one such interview, 
forced soldier Emerson Uriel Navarrete Medrana told the two that the Americans “gave 
[Navarrete’s group] specific instructions as to what we had to do” when they entered Nicaraguan 
villages and towns.  Five other ​contras ​ spoke about the Americans who not only trained their 110
units, but also were completely in charge of the entire training camp, with contra officers 
answering to these Americans.  This testimony is supported by the extensive research scholars 111
Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steers did when writing their 1987 report for the National Lawyers’ 
Guild. Steers and Ramshaw found that by 1984,  
there [were] over 50 CIA agents and other US government agents in Honduras and Costa 
Rica assisting in the war effort. Over 90 US soldiers are working with the contras and 
providing training and advice, 
 in addition to an unverifiable number of American mercenaries actively engaging in battle in 
Nicaragua.   112
A former CIA operative in Central America, David C. MacMichael, told the scholars that  
a plan involved in a bombing raid [of a civilian village] was shot down, and it turned out 
that the flight crew were US citizens.  113
While there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to say definitively whether or not 
American citizens directly committed the crimes that the contras surely did; it would be rash 
110 Emerson Uriel Navarrete Medrano, 94.  
111 Eich and Rincon, 40, 110, 130, 128.  
112 Ramshaw and Steers, 75. 
113 Arnson, 84.  
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without such evidence to claim that an American mercenary killed a civilian directly. 
Nonetheless, American citizens witnessing and not forcibly stopping the commission of war 
crimes by the ​contras ​ indicates  liability on the part of the United States. As will be discussed in 
subsequent sections, American responsibility for ​contra ​ crimes hinges on “whether the US 
government actually exercise[d] operational control over the activities of the contras.”   114
In addition to MacMichael’s testimony, an ARDE officer said that even during battles, 
the CIA  
had placed agents or trained mercenaries in key positions with the rebel group where they 
dictate…. Decisions on logistics, communications, and operations.  115
Additionally, Edgar Chomorro, one of the most influential leaders of the FDN, told reporters that 
the CIA had advised him to “murder, kidnap, rob, and torture” those who stood in the way of the 
FDN cause.  From the testimony gathered from eyewitnesses and contras fighting both 116
voluntarily and involuntarily, it is clear that agents of the US government not only would have 
been able to stop ​contra ​ violence against civilians by changing the strategic and operational 
plans that they supplied to the groups, but also were sources of encouragement for the 
commission of these crimes in the first place. 
Responsibility and Oversight: 
“The truth is, there are atrocities going on in Nicaragua,” President Reagan 
acknowledged at a fundraising dinner in 1985.  However, despite widespread reports of ​contras 117
114 Francis A.Boyle, “Determining US Responsibility for Contra Operations Under International Law,” ​The 
American Journal of International Law ​(81/1, Jan. 1987), 87.  
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committing those atrocities, the President continued to argue that the Sandinistas were violently 
oppressing their people, and claim that the arms flow from Nicaragua to violent Salvadoran 
rebels continued to exist when much evidence to the contrary proved that it did not.  The CIA 118
and the Reagan Administration gave reason after reason for American involvement in the 
conflict: first, the US needed to stop the arms flow between Nicaragua and El Salvador, but when 
no evidence of such a trade existing in any significant way was found, the US had to continue to 
aid the ​contras ​ in order to put pressure on the Sandinistas to hold elections. In 1984, when 
elections were held and declared free and fair by several international bodies, the Administration 
claimed that the elections were false and fraudulent.  Though the Nicaraguan government 119
fulfilled the requirements for negotiation set by the mediating states, the Reagan Administration 
continued to claim that it was the Sandinistas, not the US, holding up peace negotiations.  This 120
continued even after the International Human Rights Law Group submitted a report to Congress 
detailing “16 alleged ​contra ​ attacks on civilians… five ambushes of civilian vehicles… 11 
kidnappings, and seven rapes.”  Even after this report was filed, over $127 million was given to 121
the ​contras ​, and American agents continued to operate in Nicaragua.  
All of these justifications for continuing the war in Nicaragua distracted from what was 
actually occurring in Nicaragua. American mercenaries and officials were outfitting, arming, 
funding, and training ​contra ​ rebels while they violently attacked civilians in ambushes planned 
118 David C. MacMichael, in Ramshaw and Steers, 83.  
119 Chomsky, 111  
120 Anthony Lewis, “War is Peace,” ​New York Times ​(April 18, 1985).  
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dragged away her husband Ricardo, a Roman Catholic activist, and five of their children. The next 
morning, she found the mutilated bodies of the children. Her husband’s body was found later.”  
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by Americans. These Americans were violating the terms of both international agreements and 
domestic law by having oversight of and sufficient influence on ​contra ​ military activities to stop 
the ​contras’ ​ criminal activity but not endeavoring to curtail the violence or prosecute those 
committing it. This means that every one of the 90 US soldiers and 50 CIA and government 
agents mentioned previously are responsible for ​contra ​ crimes, as are President Reagan and the 
“core group” of bureaucrats that controlled the Nicaraguan war from Washington, D.C.  122
Additionally, the Americans running training camps and giving the ​contras ​ orders are also 
culpable for the crimes committed by those who took their orders.  
The concept of indirect responsibility is complicated, but the behavior of American 
agents is governed by several bodies of law. One of these is the Geneva Conventions, to which 
the United States is a party; it has signed and ratified the treaty, and adopted its obligations into 
domestic law. This means that the United States is obligated to follow the requirements of the 
treaty. If it does not, it breaks international and domestic law. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
the United States frequently breaches the Geneva Conventions on the law of warfare, but these 
breaches should still be considered by readers as extremely serious.  
An earlier section discussed the nature of the war crimes that ​contra ​ groups committed, 
but the United States’ role in those crimes can only be understood through an analysis of the 
Geneva Conventions. First, it is important to note that Article Two of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (from here, GCIV) determines 
that these laws of war apply to signatory parties in any armed conflict, regardless of whether or 
not those parties declare war or even openly acknowledge the war; therefore, regardless of the 
122 Boyle, 87-88. See also: Ramshaw and Steers, 75.  
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US Congress’ decision not to declare war on Nicaragua, GCIV still applies.  Article 1 of the 123
GCIV requires that all parties in a conflict respect civilians, and requires signatory states to 
ensure that other parties to the conflict also respect civilians.  The United States broke this 124
obligation not only by refusing to stop the ​contra’s ​ violence against civilians, but also by 
encouraging and training ​contras ​ to “murder, kidnap, rob, and torture.”  The terms of 125
respecting civilians are outlined in Article 147, which details what actions constitute grave 
breaches of the laws of war; as noted earlier, these actions include murder, kidnapping, robbery, 
torture, rape, and forced conscription, all of which evidence demonstrates the contras committed.
  126
The United States had a duty to stop these crimes. The government clearly exercised a 
degree of operational control over the ​contras ​ to be capable of preventing the outright strategy of 
harming civilians. As one ex-Marine turned mercenary said, “massacres of civilians are not 
scattered human rights abuses… but rather the game plan.”  Not only does the GCIV require 127
the United States, as a High Contracting Party, to search for and try known perpetrators of such 
grave breaches, but moreover, the US is deemed directly responsible for the actions of its agents 
by Article 29 of the GCIV.  Though the US signed and ratified these laws without an open 128
treaty reservation, the state has consistently broken the terms of the GCIV through its actions in 
Vietnam and Nicaragua, among other conflict zones. Nonetheless, the only international court 
that was able to try states before the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2000 was the 
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International Court of Justice, to which Nicaragua brought a complaint against the United States 
in 1984.  
The ICJ released its decision in ​Nicaragua v. USA ​on June 27, 1986. The opinion 
established that the United States was responsible for financing, training, equipping, arming, and 
organizing the ​contras ​, and ordered the US to stop its attack on the Nicaraguan state.  The 129
Court relied upon the charter of the Organization of American States’ Article 19, which, like 
Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations, dictates that  
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle 
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural 
elements.  130
In ​Nicaragua v. US ​, the Court found that the US, by supporting the contras in such a concrete 
manner, had violated its treaty obligations to the OAS and UN. The Court also rejected the US’ 
claim that its actions in the war were in the name of collective self defense, and ordered the US 
to cease all material support for the ​contras ​.   131
Nonetheless, the Court did not mention whether or not it found the US responsible for the 
contras’ ​ actions. It did not hold ​contra ​ fighters or their American directors responsible for 
international crimes, though it was within the Court’s purview to do so. This action (or rather, 
inaction) by the Court was likely politically motivated; a decision against the United States, one 
of its most fervent proponents, would bring hostile criticism upon the Court. By deciding with 
129 ​Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (​Nicar. v. U.S.​), 1986 I.C.J.14, Article 437, 
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the standing law, but without actually holding Americans responsible for the grave breaches of 
the laws of war, the Court avoided some of that criticism.   132
Regardless of the completeness of the Court’s opinion, the Reagan Administration 
refused to acknowledge it. After the ruling, a State Department spokesman dismissed the case, 
saying that it was demonstrative of the Court’s inability to handle cases of such a complex 
nature.  The Administration continued to argue that the Court did not have jurisdiction, and that 133
the Court did not have access to sensitive materials that would excuse the American interference. 
In several editorials, the ​New York Times ​ pledged its support for the Administration in the case, 
writing that “there was legitimate doubt whether Nicaragua had proper standing… to bring this 
case before the World Court.”  This position, publicized by one of the largest news media 134
organizations in the United States, lent considerable legitimacy to the Reagan Administration’s 
position among the American people, regardless of the fact that it was technically incorrect. The 
court of public opinion did not call for the prosecution of members of the administration or CIA 
for its actions in Nicaragua, let alone the President himself, despite his openly breaking domestic 
law. 
One of the most direct breaches of American law that the President broke was the Boland 
Amendment. Signed on December 21, 1982, the Boland Amendment was a rider attached to the 
House Appropriations Bill of 1982, as well as to the Defense Appropriations Acts of 1982 and 
132 Boyle, 86.  
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1983.  The Amendment prohibits the use of funds to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. 135
Indeed, in 1984, the President issued an assurance that  
the US does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua; nor to 
impose or compel any particular form of government there,  136
though he said in February of 1985, and again on repeated occasion, that the goal was to make 
the Sandinista government “say uncle.”  Reagan did not simply break his promises to Congress 137
to only give humanitarian aid, he also broke a domestic law that he, not his predecessors or the 
international community, signed into law when he signed the House Appropriations Bill, and the 
two Defense Appropriations Bills.  Nonetheless, no one was prosecuted.  
Justification: 
The Reagan Administration defended its interference in Nicaragua using what this author 
will call the “Thanks, Communism” tactic. This strategy consisted of constant assurances from 
the President and other proponents of the contras that the Sandinistas were going to cause the fall 
of Latin America to communism. Anything and everything that happened in Latin America in 
the latter half of the 20th century that negatively impacted the United States was blamed on 
communism, even in instances where the Soviet state or its doctrine were not at all involved.  
The State Department actively engaged in propagating this Cold War anxiety. In 1985, 
the State Department released a white paper on the Nicaraguan revolution that quoted 
Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge Martinez as saying “this revolution goes beyond our 
borders.”  The white paper suggested that this quotation was conclusive proof that the 138
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Sandinistas had intentions to export leftist revolutions to the rest of Latin America. However, the 
State Department very seriously, and perhaps intentionally, misrepresented what Borge actually 
said by taking this quotation out of context; Borge’s full quotation describes the Sandinista 
revolution as part of a new era in Latin America of independence from military dictatorships.  139
Nonetheless, the damage was already done; the white paper had been published, and added to 
anxiety among Americans over the small Central American nation, allowing the Reagan 
Administration to use that anxiety to promote the war. The President and his proponents 
threatened political opponents with being “soft on communism,” which “heighten[ed] the 
domestic political costs of opposing the President.”  Though under the UN Charter and the 140
Geneva Conventions war may only be started for self- or third party-defense, by arguing that the 
contra ​ war was preventing the dangerous spread of communism, Reagan expanded the definition 
of self-defense, helping to promote the concept’s ever-expanding elasticity that has enabled 
states to wage war with little restraint since signing laws prohibiting wars of aggression.   141
Consequences and Conclusion:  
The consequences of the United States’ war in Nicaragua have been vast and important. 
First, the US’ actions in supporting the ​contras ​ brought heavy criticism of the Reagan 
Administration from the international community. Second, the US’ decision not to prosecute any 
contras ​ for their crimes or any American officials for their oversight in those crimes has had a 
deep impact on international criminal law. International condemnation of American activities 
wrought  damage on American credibility abroad. A delegation of “Concerned European 
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Parliamentarians” wrote President Reagan a public letter warning that the US’ actions in 
Nicaragua would threaten NATO alliances.  In 1983, the UN General Assembly condemned the 142
intervention, and throughout the 1980s, leaders from states all over the world objected to the US 
unauthorized use of force and support for the contras.  By 1985, the Institute for Policy Studies 143
released a report that began by noting that “American credibility with nations that are most 
important to our national welfare…is eroding.”  Though the Reagan Administration nor the 144
CIA was prosecuted for its responsibility for ​contra ​ crimes, American relationships abroad 
suffered greatly after the war.  
There are many reasons why no American was held accountable for the war crimes 
committed in Nicaragua. These reasons will appear similar to those given for the lack of 
substantial prosecution efforts during and after the Vietnam War presented in the previous 
chapter. Foremost, there is no international body capable of forcing the United States to try an 
American citizen, let alone to export a citizen for trial in an international court. Even in the 
1980s, the United States possessed the most powerful military in the world; there is very little on 
this earth that could force the United States government to do anything. As scholar Patrick 
Hagopian writes,  
this situation places the onus of responsibility on the US for ensuring that its own legal 
institutions and courts respect and observe the same standards it has promulgated through 
its… participation in international tribunals.   145
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For a citizen to be prosecuted for crimes in Nicaragua, the American government would have to 
request and begin the prosecution, which is extremely unlikely. Such a prosecution would be 
seen as an admission of guilt on the part of the United States, admitting that the government had 
broken the law and done wrong, which would have such great political consequences 
internationally and domestically that it simply will not happen. That the ICJ refused to 
acknowledge American responsibility for contra actions tacitly allowed the US government to 
also continue to refuse to acknowledge this responsibility. If there is no allegiance to the law, the 
law is powerless; in engaging in ​contra ​ activities, and in refusing to prosecute either ​contras ​ or 
the Americans who aided them, the United States demonstrated its allegiance not to the law, but 
to its exemption from that law, contributing to the weakness of international criminal law.  
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Chapter Three: Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo and the Law 
Introduction: 
The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia was a violent, long-lasting, and ethnically 
charged process. The territories that now make up Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, 
Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herçegovina were torn by pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions 
exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This chapter will focus mainly on 
the human rights violations committed by the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) during 
the spring of 1999 in Kosovo, but to understand the context of NATO’s actions, we must first 
discuss the context in which they took place. 
In 1989, as the USSR’s growing weakness destabilized the Balkan region, the Serbian 
government officially revoked Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province within the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  As the rest of the Balkans underwent violent transformations 146
into Serbian authoritarianism that accompanied rising Serbian nationalism, Kosovo remained 
largely peaceful; nonetheless, as the early 1990s passed, Kosovo became the site of government 
oppression of Kosovar Albanians, an ethnic group with a long history of conflict with Serbs.  147
From these conditions sprung the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which developed into a fierce 
guerilla army that clashed with Serbian police forces, spurring even more state-sanctioned 
violence.  NATO allies watched as the Balkans spun even further into a cycle of indiscriminate 148
violence and a campaign of ethnic cleansing began. Many have criticized NATO’s hesitance to 
act, suggesting that had the West intervened sooner, thousands of lives would have been saved 
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from Slobodan Milosevic’s humanitarian abuses, and from the displacement the Balkan wars 
caused.   149
Milosevic’s strategy for overtaking Kosovo was to incite Serbian nationalists in the 
reason, even going so far as to arm civilians Serbs and encourage them to use those weapons 
against Kosovar Albanians.  Riots, muggings, rapes, and kidnappings ensued at the hands of 150
the police as well as armed civilians in the name of protecting Yugoslavia from “Albanian 
secessionists” who may or may not have existed. Moreover, Milosevic and his army began a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing, attempting to drive out or kill the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. 
While thousands of Albanians emigrated to neighboring countries as Milosevic became more and 
more oppressive, thousands more stayed as the Serbian state physically intimidated, 
economically and socially marginalized, and limited the rights of Kosovar Albanians.  By the 151
late 1990s, Serbian forces were driving an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Albanian 
population all over Yugoslavia, but most intensely focused on Kosovo.  
People all across the world called for the Western powers to step in. Though NATO had 
been involved in the Balkan wars before the 1999 bombing campaign, Kosovo had been left 
untouched; however, the Kosovo region became especially violent along ethnic lines because 
Serbs and Albanians have fought over the land for centuries.  As Kosovar Albanians realized 152
that nonviolence was ineffective against Milosevic and the KLA began contributing to the 
149 Ibid. Throughout his entire memoir, Norris reflects over and over again that he believes NATO could 
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reorganize the Yugoslav region after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989.  
150 Human Rights Watch, 27.  
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violence, the international community looked on. This chapter will analyze the decision making 
process that led to NATO’s Operation Allied Force, a 78-day bombing campaign, and the 
international legal theory behind it.  
Alliance Politics, and Decisions  
The Decision Making Process  
One of the chief criticisms of Operation Allied Force is the means by which NATO came 
to the decision to bomb Kosovo. Every member of NATO has signed and ratified the Geneva 
Conventions as well as the United Nations Charter, meaning each state is bound to the 
procedures detailed in the Conventions and the Charter.  The UN Charter dictates the structure 153
of the UN, while the Geneva Conventions are generally thought of as the laws of modern 
warfare.  According to Articles 33 and 34 of the UN Charter, states must bring their complaints 154
against one another to the UN Security Council before taking any action, military or economic.  155
The UNSC has the authority to draft resolutions imposing sanctions, embargoes, and allowing 
states to use violence, but its ultimate goal is to maintain international peace and security.  156
Without a UNSC permission, a state is breaking international law of war by committing violence 
against or within another state; that violence is considered a war of aggression.  In the case of 157
Operation Allied Force, NATO did not receive UNSC permission to bomb Kosovo.  
153 Members of NATO at the time of the Kosovo Conflict include: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, ​Italy​, ​Luxembourg ​, ​the Netherlands​, ​Norway​, ​Portugal ​, ​the United Kingdom​, ​the United States​, 
Greece, ​West Germany​, and ​Spain ​. When East and West Germany were reunified in 1990, the nation 
joined the alliance fully. See: North Atlantic Trade Organization, “What is NATO?”, 
http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html ​.  
154 See previous chapters for information on the Geneva Conventions.  
155 ​United Nations, Articles 33-34, ​Charter of the United Nations​,  24 October 1945, 
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However, the UNSC did release several resolutions attempting to quell the violence in the 
Balkan states. In 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1160, which officially condemned Serbian 
use of violence against the people of Kosovo, as well as established an arms embargo. This 
meant that to sell or bring arms into the Balkan region became a crime.  Later the same year, 158
the UNSC adopted Resolution 1199. Resolution 1199 noted that an arms flow to the Balkan 
states had continued after 1160, and firmly demanded that all actors, including guerilla groups 
and Milosevic’s police force, commit to an immediate ceasefire. It also calls on Milosevic’s 
government to cease its targeting of the civilian population in Kosovo, and to allow refugees to 
return to their homes.  The violence did not stop. Indeed, the targeting of Kosovar Albanian 159
civilians seemed to increase in late 1998, bringing more calls to the international community to 
intervene.  In October of 1998, the UNSC condemned the Yugoslav government, and endorsed 160
NATO efforts to keep Milosevic and his officials in peace negotiations, but also noted that those 
negotiations were not having the desired effect. It also reaffirmed the UNSC’s previous demand 
for all violent actors to commit to a ceasefire, and urged states outside the region to commit 
humanitarian aid. Finally, it called for the full participation in and cooperation with the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by Yugoslav forces and leaders.  These were 161
the final UNSC resolutions released before the NATO bombing that began on March 24, 1999, 
and clearly never gave NATO, or any actor, permission to conduct an aerial campaign, or any 
158 United Nations Security Counsel, Resolution 1160, “On the Letters from the United Kingdom and the 
United States,”31 March, 1998, 
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“​https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/279/96/PDF/N9827996.pdf?OpenElement​.  
160 Human Rights Watch,47.  
161 United Nations Security Counsel, Resolution 1203, “On the Situation in Kosovo,” 24 October, 1998, 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/321/21/PDF/N9832121.pdf?OpenElement​.  
51 
other military action. Nonetheless, it is notable that the Yugoslav government was able to 
completely ignore these resolutions by the institution that was intended to be the most powerful 
on earth. With no enforcement mechanism, the UNSC’s resolutions did basically nothing to 
actually stop the violence taking place in the Balkans. Though NATO’s use of force without the 
UNSC’s endorsement was illegal and a breach of the UN Charter, the UN’s efforts accomplished 
little. In October of 1998, soon after Resolution 1203 was released, NATO declared that 
airstrikes would be launched “if Milosevic broke [a previous agreement to] withdraw one-third 
of his troops from Kosovo, and the KLA was expected to cease its attacks as well.”  162
The Decision to Act and Rambouillet  
One of the most outspoken leaders within NATO was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. 
The American media even nicknamed the conflict in Kosovo “Madeleine’s War,” and 
consistently suggested that her passion (and thus, the United States’ involvement) for 
intervention in the Balkans was caused by her own personal history as a refugee, first from 
Hitler’s Prague, and then from the Soviet takeover of Belgrade in the mid-20th century.  163
Regardless of the source of Albright’s interest in the conflict, her leadership as the first female 
Secretary of State drove NATO to action. In 1999, during Operation Allied Force, she told a 
Time Magazine ​reporter: “Just because you can’t act everywhere doesn’t mean you don’t act 
anywhere.”  Albright continually argued for humanitarian intervention, ushering the United 164
States into a new role as “the indispensable nation asserting its morality as well as its interests to 
assure stability, stop thugs, and prevent human atrocities.”  Albright led NATO’s charge to 165
162 Norris, xxi.  
163 Walter Isaacson, “Madeleine’s War,” ​Time Magazine, ​May 9, 1999.  
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bring Kosovar Albanian leaders and Milosevic’s representatives to the negotiation table in 
Rambouillet, France in February of 1999.  
John Norris, a State Department official, describes the Rambouillet Conference in his 
memoir about the conflict, ​Collision Course​. Norris notes that the Albanians present at the talks 
represented such varied, disparate groups were “mutually distrustful,” and did not hold the actual 
power needed to negotiate.  More importantly, Yugoslav President Milosevic did not attend the 166
talks himself, instead sending several delegates who held low positions in his government, and 
were effectively powerless; Norris also reported that these delegates drank heavily.  On top of 167
these issues, Russia, which held the most sway over the Milosevic regime, made clear at the 
negotiations that it hoped the talks would collapse.  Norris argued that  168
the view from Russia… was that the US and its allies were now committed to an 
ambitious new program of humanitarian intervention with NATO serving as the world’s 
policeman, 
an obvious reason for Russia to benefit from the failure of the conference.  In short, the 169
conference was “doomed to failure from the start.”  Though Kosovar representatives signed the 170
conference’s agreement that gave Kosovo autonomy with NATO ground troops as peacekeepers, 
the Serbian delegation refused to sign, continuing to state that Kosovo belonged to Yugoslavia, 
and rejecting a clause that would have allowed NATO unrestricted access throughout 
Yugoslavia.  With Russia the only delegation that could impact Milosevic without a threat of 171
force, the talks fell apart quickly. The delegates watched as Organization for Security and 
166 Norris, xxi.  
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors reported Serbian and Yugoslav forces organizing 
themselves around Kosovo’s border with Serbia proper, a clear indication that Milosevic was 
planning a large scale offensive against the Kosovo territory.  172
On March 20th, 1999, Milosevic and Serbian forces launched a new offensive against 
Kosovar Albanians after a winter of increasing the number of military and paramilitary members 
in Kosovo.  Where previously only police forces had clashed against KLA members during 173
riots and seemingly random acts of violence, the weeks immediately preceding Operation Allied 
Force saw an increase in military deployments to the area. In January, 1999, the KLA ambushed 
a group of Serbian police officers south of Pristina. The government responded by conducting a 
summary execution of 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak in a massacre that was 
photographed by monitors from the OSCE.  The well-documented carnage brought an outcry 174
from the international community, which, weeks later, watched as Milosevic began “Operation 
Horseshoe” on March 20th, days after the Rambouillet Conference officially ended.  
During the conference, NATO received reports from the Austrian government and later 
the German government that Milosevic was preparing a large-scale offensive against Kosovar 
Albanians; these reports alleged that planning for this operation began in the fall of 1998, months 
before the Rambouillet peace talks failed.  The OSCE withdrew its monitors on March 20th, 175
resulting in a dramatic escalation of violence in Kosovo known as Operation Horseshoe.  It has 176
been nearly impossible for observers to accurately track civilian casualties as a result of 
Operation Horseshoe, largely because Milosevic used NATO bombings as a scapegoat for 
172 Ibid., 59. 
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civilian casualties, and claimed that those killed or detained were actually Albanian militant 
rebels.  
Despite the fogginess of data, it is clear that Operation Horseshoe was an ethnic cleansing 
campaign. Immediately after OSCE monitors left the Balkans, Serbian and Yugoslav forces 
began burning villages, committing mass executions, and forcing thousands of Kosovar 
Albanians to leave their homes.  Much of this violence was shielded by the confusion caused 177
by the NATO bombings that began on March 24, 1999. 
The Air Campaign: 
Just after eight in the evening on March 24, NATO began bombing military targets using 
planes flying around 15,000 feet above Kosovo.  That night, NATO forces struck 40 military 178
targets and shot down three Yugoslav planes.  Throughout the 78 day air campaign, pilots 179
continued to fly at high altitudes, following a strategy designed to minimize NATO casualties. 
Though Milosevic claimed his troops shot down the helicopter, the only NATO military 
members to die were killed in non-combat helicopter crash that the US Army determined was a 
mechanical malfunction.   180
However, Operation Allied Force caused literally incalculable civilian casualties.  In its 181
study of the Kosovo humanitarian crisis, Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that there were 90 
177 Human Rights Watch, 112-113. 
178 Norris, 5.  
179 Ibid.  
180 Dana Priest, “Army’s Apache Helicopter Rendered Impotent in Kosovo,” ​Washington Post, ​December 
29, 1999, A1.  
181 Here, incalculable should be taken to mean literally uncountable. Milosevic’s military frequently planted 
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separate incidents involving civilians deaths during NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign.  182
According to the data HRW presents, between  278 and 317 civilians died in Kosovo alone.  183
While these casualties are tragic, and horrifying, they should be considered as quite different 
from the civilians deaths discussed in previous chapters. In Vietnam and Nicaragua, Americans 
willfully and knowingly caused harm to the civilian populations, whether by attacking them 
directly without evidence that they were involved with the enemy, or by supporting groups that 
targeted civilians. Conversely, in Kosovo, the civilian casualties were accidental. Though NATO 
could have done more strategically to lessen the likelihood of civilians deaths, those deaths were 
fundamentally not intentional, protecting NATO troops and officers from being responsible for 
war crimes.  
 
 
International Law and its Application 
Intentionality is key to determining responsibility when considering violence that affects 
civilians. Were civilians the target of an armed attack? Did the attackers take appropriate 
measures to ensure civilian safety? What was the motivation behind the attack in the first place? 
As one can imagine, the answers to these questions fall on the spectrum between objective and 
subjective; finding evidence of such a nature is complicated, and the context of decisions is very 
important. This section will analyze the laws surrounding civilian casualties caused by NATO’s 
airstrikes, and then the legality of NATO’s involvement in the conflict as a whole. 
Civilian Deaths and the Nature of Air Campaigns. 
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On April 14th, 1999, NATO pilots bombed what they believed, from an altitude of over 
15,000 feet, was a military convoy on the Djakovica-Decan Road for about two hours.  184
Tragically, the convoy was not made up solely of military vehicles, as NATO strategists had 
previously thought. Instead, the 12-mile stretch that pilots bombed repeatedly was filled with 
Kosovar Albanian refugees, being escorted (or deported) by several military vehicles.  73 185
confirmed deaths were civilians, and another 36 civilians were injured.  As more information 186
was released by witnesses and human rights groups, NATO’s response changed from insistence 
that the convoy was solely military, to a confession of a tragic mistake; many, including 
monitors from HRW, see this change in message as a sign that the bombing was sincerely not 
meant to harm civilians, and that NATO genuinely believed that there would be no civilian loss 
of life.  Additionally, HRW and the International Red Cross were unable to find any evidence 187
suggesting that anyone within the NATO operation had any knowledge of civilians within the 
Djakovica-Decan convoy.  What this means, then, is that NATO did not commit a war crime, 188
for it did not knowingly or intentionally gravely breach any of the Geneva Conventions.  
Nonetheless, NATO’s use of airstrikes in lieu of military action that could be more 
accurate in targeting does inspire questions about NATO’s adherence to Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions. Protocol I generally protects civilians, and by signing it, each member state agreed 
that it “must take all precautions to avoid or minimize harm to civilians, and to this end may not 
attack… combatants and civilians indiscriminately.”   Before the Djakovica-Decan bombings, 189
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NATO’s policy was to have its pilots fly and bomb from at least 15,000. Even with the advanced 
technology available, weather changes and the limits of technology and human eyesight may 
have impaired NATO’s ability to take adequate measures to protect civilians. As HRW’s report 
declared,  
if precision would have been greater… had NATO pilots flown lower, it could be argued 
that there may have been a point at which NATO was obligated to have its pilots fly 
lower.  190
By choosing the less accurate strategic option and having high flying pilots rather than ground 
troops or even bombing from a lower altitude, NATO violated humanitarian law. Each member 
state pledged upon signing the Geneva Conventions that it would take every precaution to protect 
the lives of civilians. Though the decision to go through with an aerial campaign may have saved 
countless military men and women, it resulted in excessive civilian casualties because NATO 
was not able to properly identify and verify many of the objects it bombed far below its planes. It 
is likely that ground troops or even lower flying planes would have been capable of properly 
avoiding civilian casualties.  While NATO has an inherent interest in and right to value the 191
lives of its soldiers and pilots, it also has a legal obligation to value the lives of civilians over the 
lives of its troops; not surprisingly, however, this principle falls into a political and moral gray 
area for many world leaders.  
NATO’s Entrance into the Conflict 
By entering what was previously an internal conflict, NATO transformed the Balkan 
wars into an international armed conflict. This meant that on March 24th, 1999, at approximately 
190 Human Rights Watch, 443.  
191 David Scheffer, “War Crimes and the Clinton Administration, ​Social Research ​(Vol. 69, No. 4, 2002), 
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8:01PM, as soon Operation Allied Force dropped its first bombs, the “full body of international 
humanitarian law applied” to all of the Yugoslav region, making Milosevic and his soldiers 
responsible for their crimes not only within Yugoslav laws, but also international laws.  This 192
allowed the United Nations to form the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and to bring Milosevic and other Yugoslav decision-makers to justice for 
their crimes.   Though NATO’s entrance into the conflict was contrary to its member-states’ 193
obligations Articles 33 and 34 of the UN Charter, the ICTY was able to support its claims to 
jurisdiction over the Yugoslav criminals because the conflict was international.  
Nonetheless, the alliance did breach its UN obligations by committing violence without 
UNSC approval. Furthermore, it committed the act of aggression by entering the conflict when 
no NATO member-state had been attacked. As discussed in previous chapters, Article Two of 
the Geneva Conventions ensure the the laws of war apply even when the parties involved do not 
declare war officially.  The legal definitions surrounding the crime of aggression are 194
complicated and nuanced, and have been hotly debated since states began codifying customary 
law together in the post-Great War world. After the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact codified an 
agreement between dozens of nations not to use war or violence to settle disputes, states needed 
a solid definition of the crime of aggression, which led to the 1933-1934 Conventions for the 
Definition of Aggression (CDA).   These conventions were signed and ratified by the League 195
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of Nations member-states, several Middle Eastern states, and most of Northern and Eastern 
Europe, and declared that the crime of aggression would be defined as:  
Declaration of war upon another state; Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a 
declaration of war, of the territory of another state; Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, 
with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state; 
Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; and, provision of support to armed 
bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another state...  196
Many international legal scholars argue that this definition has been in use for so many 
generations that it has become a part of international customary law.  However, defining 197
customary law is notoriously difficult because it is based not on any tangible document or 
written standard, but rather on the practices of states and the laws to which they have actually 
adhered.   198
After the CDA came World War Two, and with it, the Nuremberg Protocols, which 
formed the foundation of the United Nations and modern international law. Principal VI, 
Paragraph A of the Nuremberg Protocols defines a crime against peace as the  
 [p]lanning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances; [and the] participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned [in the previous 
clause].  199
Though this definition is noticeably different from that outline by the CDA, but it carries the 
same ultimate message when applied to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: NATO, as a signatory 
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of the UN Charter, and with most of its members as participants in the CDA and the Nuremberg 
Tribunals, committed a crime against peace under these laws.  
The UN Charter states in Article Two, Paragraph Four that states may not intervene in 
one another’s affairs by any means “in any manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United 
Nations.”  At first glance, this appears to be another obligation that NATO breached in 1999, 200
but actually, it is where the Kosovo case differs drastically from those of Vietnam or Nicaragua.
  Scholar Peter J. Anderson wrote that “law and specific systems of ethics, of course, do not 201
often coincide.”  Though Anderson argues against NATO’s use of force in Kosovo, describing 202
it as a serious violation of international law, the law had not yet caught up to a humanitarian 
system of ethics. In order to comply with the spirit of international law described in the UN 
Charter, NATO had to break that law. The UN Charter professes again and again the 
organization’s desire and intention to protect the innocent from state-sanctioned violence 
alongside the Geneva Conventions’ mission. By 1998, it was clear that Kosovar Albanians 
would not have success against Milosevic using peaceful means, and that the KLA would never 
have the manpower or weapons supplies to end the ethnic cleansing campaigns and deportations.
 Even if NATO’s intentions for entering the war were not to uphold the UN’s purpose, the 203
consequences if Milosevic had been allowed to continue gaining control in the region would 
have been dire; his ethnic cleansing campaign could have turned into outright genocide if left 
unchecked. While stopping Milosevic does not excuse NATO’s breaches of the law (especially 
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its lack of precaution for civilian casualties), Operation Allied Force did bring a war criminal’s 
reign of terror to an end.  By June of 1999, NATO’s threats of deploying ground forces as well 
as the bombing campaign finally forced Milosevic to peace talks.  The war ended with the 204
Kumanov Agreement. There are still lingering questions over whether or not this agreement was 
legal and therefore binding, since the agreement was reached under threat of force at NATO’s 
hand; Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares a treaty void if it is 
reached via coercion.  Nonetheless, the treaty was honored, and Milosevic and many members 205
of his government were tried by the ICTY.  
After the War  
The United States government never articulated a clear legal justification condoning its 
NATO actions, instead relying upon an amorphous listing of factors that together 
justified the intervention as a matter of policy, 
writes Harold Koh, critical of the decisions the Clinton Administration made during the Balkan 
wars.  Koh is fundamentally correct; whenever asked to defend American violations of 206
international law during the conflict, Clinton and Albright would dive into a conversation about 
the United States’ responsibility to intervene in humanitarian conflicts.  207
 In an interview with CNN, Clinton said that “if the world community has the power to 
stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing.”  Clinton went on to argue that the 208
United States was obligated to intervene if there was a moral imperative, like stopping genocide 
or ethnic cleansing, if the physical territory was of strategic import to the United States, and if 
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the intervention would have low American casualties.  Though this broad argument, which 209
CNN nicknamed “the Clinton Doctrine,” is quite difficult to put into practice, it points to a 
growing trend in international legal theory.  
After Nuremberg established the modern conception of the crime of aggression, the Cold 
War enflamed the anxieties of the American people; all-out war seemed a daily threat. Scholar 
Linda S. Bishai writes,  
[t]he American legal profession turned to the… consent-based approach… and developed 
a concept of the international lawyer as policymaker, in which a whole range of policy 
options [including an all-out war] could be justified as necessary,  
and as self defense or third party defense.  This meant that outlawing wars of aggression did 210
not stop states from engaging in interstate violence, but rather, made those states justify the war 
in a different manner. Rather than arguing that a war is a just war between equal foes, as was 
ideal before the CDA, after Nuremberg, states justified their military actions by depicting wars as 
“wars of necessity, or self defense, policing action” or third party defense.  The change is 211
significant, and reflects Secretary Albright’s view of the Kosovo conflict as  
ground zero in the debate over whether America should play a new role in the world, that 
of the indispensable nation asserting its morality as well as its interests to assure stability, 
stop thugs, and prevent human atrocities.  212
That the United States did not need to make a legal justification for its involvement in 
Kosovo demonstrates the truth of Joseph Margulies’ declaration that “power implies the license 
to make and justify the rules.”  This is sobering. NATO members were not sanctioned or tried 213
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for their actions in Kosovo, but instead, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244, authorizing a foreign 
civil and military presence in the region, while UN General Assembly President Kofi Annan 
praised NATO’s actions.  214
 Moreover, the UN made three mistakes that would impact the future of international law 
by not sanctioning NATO. First, the UN demonstrated to the world that there was no force on 
earth that could force wealthy Western nations, especially the United States, to do anything. 
Imposing economic sanctions on the United States, let alone every member of NATO, would 
cripple the world, and would likely be logistically impossible anyway, but demonstrating this 
truth so forcefully by not even trying to condemn NATO’s illegal actions was a stark reminder of 
where power actually lay in the world.  Secondly, when the UN did not sanction NATO for 215
committing crimes it had punished other states for committing, the UN showed that “its rules are 
enforced only selectively and only in accordance with the preferences of great powers.”  The 216
UN set an obvious double standard in its legal code that inherently weakened that code. Were 
some countries responsible under international criminal law while others were not? Were the 
laws NATO broke simply not going to be enforced anymore? One can easily see the confusion 
and immorality in this situation. Finally, the United Nations opened the door to future collective 
breaches of international criminal law. When it did not punish or condemn NATO for its 
breaches of law, the UN tacitly accepted that a “group of state can unilaterally decide to 
214 ​UN Security Council, ​Security Council Resolution 1244, “​On the Deployment of International Civil and 
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intervene.”  This principle alone could have grave impacts on the state of international criminal 217
law. For example, should several states band together to exterminate an unpopular ethnic 
minority, and those states would be logistically difficult to punish, what action could the UN 
take, following the precedent it set after Operation Allied Force? The implications are, indeed, 
sobering. The aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo demonstrates that the US is of grave 
importance to the ability of the global community to respond to state-sanctioned violence and 
atrocity crimes, both as a predominant military power, but also as a state signatory of modern 
international criminal law.  218
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Though President Clinton repeatedly spoke of his hope for a permanent war crimes 
tribunal like the ones in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, he ultimately opposed the creation of the 
International Criminal Court. As a result, the United States is not a member of the ICC, a 
position that substantially weakens both the US’ ability to claim it acts in the interests of the 
global community and the ICC’s ability to properly enforce the Rome Statute, which mirrors the 
Geneva Conventions in its definitions of war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against 
humanity. America’s consistent refusal to join the ICC stems from the fear the the ICC would 
prosecute Americans. 
However, until it became clear that the Rome Statute would include the crime of 
aggression, the United States was a dedicated leader while the document was drafted. The United 
States vehemently argued against including the crime. One observer noted that  
it was evident that the reluctance to give ambitious new crimes courts jurisdiction over 
the central crime of war-making derived from the [United S]tates’ ambivalent legacy 
after Nuremberg.  219
At Nuremberg, the United States had insisted on prosecuting Nazi leaders for bringing such a 
war to Europe, and on demonstrating Nuremberg was not “victor’s justice,” but rather, a standard 
for all nations.  However, as noted in the quotation above, American actions contradicted the 220
ideology that dominated Nuremberg. The United States had reason to fear prosecution within the 
new ICC, as demonstrated by the previous chapters.  
Instead of joining the ICC and acknowledging its war crimes, the United States adopted 
the American Service-Member’s Protection Act. The Act prohibits American cooperation with 
219 Jonathan Bush, “The Supreme Crime and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of 
Aggressive War”, ​Columbia Law Review, ​(Vol. 102, No. 8, 2002), 2328.  
220 Taylor, 50-79.  
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the Court, and “authorizes the use of all means necessary to secure the release of Americans held 
by or for the ICC.”  Not only does the American government oppose the ICC, but it 221
deliberately fights against its jurisdiction, attempting to undermine it.  Many regard the Court 222
as a failure given its inefficiency and perhaps disproportional focus on African criminals, but it is 
possible that with American support, the Court could have been what it was intended to be: an 
enforcement mechanism for international criminal law.  
The United States has also made little progress in regulating the domestic prosecution of 
American service-members. In 1996, Congress passed the War Crimes Act, which adopted the 
grave breaches defined by the Geneva Conventions into domestic law and created a system 
through which the Department of Justice could try a service-member.  Unfortunately, no 223
American service-member has ever been tried under the WCA.  The political repercussions of 224
trying someone under the law would be vast, especially because doing so would be effectively 
admitting that the American military violated international law.  Though obviously ethically 225
preferable to continuing to ignore the war crimes of the 20th century, trials of this nature are 
extremely unlikely to take place.  
Final Notes 
This thesis has demonstrated that the United States has indubitably committed grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions by using military intervention to protect American interests, 
by either directly committing or allowing the commission of crimes against civilians, and by 
221 Megan A. Fairlie, “The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful 
Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage,” ​Berkeley Law Review, ​(Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011), 538.  
222 Emily Krasnor, “Undermining International Law by Opposing the International Criminal Court,” ​Peace 
Review ​(Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004), 323.  
223 Pittman and Heaphy, 173-174.  
224 Ibid.  
225 Ibid., 174.  
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failing to hold those perpetrators responsible. Nonetheless, there exists no force, military or 
economic, that could coerce the United States into submitting its service-members to 
international courts or tribunals. Thus, the responsibility to enforce the legal standards held 
sacred by the Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, and the United States’ own professed 
ideology lies solely with the United States itself. America is one of the few nations on earth 
capable of offering a fair and full trial to those who commit the most heinous of crimes. Thus far, 
it has refused to do so when its own leaders have violated the laws of war in Vietnam, and 
Nicaragua, and this refusal has changed the enforceability and the nature of the international 
criminal law that so many fought to codify.  
Chapter Three quoted Secretary Madeleine Albright when she said that “just because you 
can’t act everywhere doesn’t mean you don’t act anywhere.  Albright was defending America’s 226
involvement in Kosovo at the time, encouraging the United States to protect the rights of ethnic 
and religious minorities all over the world. However, this concept of acting where one is able can 
also be applied to the future of American war crimes law in holding individuals accountable for 
their past crimes; just because one cannot prosecute every war criminal does not mean one 
should not prosecute any.  
 
 
 
 
 
226 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, quoted in Walter Isaacson, “Madeleine’s War,” ​Time Magazine, 
May 9, 1999.  
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